Biglari Takes Another Crack At Cracker Barrel

Unchastened by his unsuccessful proxy fight for a Board seat at (CBRL), (BH) Chairman and CEO has begun aggressively purchasing Cracker Barrel stock once again.  had been held to 9.9% by

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store

a rights plan which was voted down by shareholders at the annual meeting in December.  Free to acquire more Cracker Barrel stock, it was reported last week that Biglari had upped his stake to 11.8%. Now, a new 13D/A has been filed showing he has continued to buy this week, reaching 13.3% of the company, even as the price went up.  It’s not clear how much more Biglari will acquire, but one thing is clear- he’s not done fighting.  Biglari’s track record in unlocking value at Insuracorp, and Penn Miller is impressive.  He is underwater on his CCA Industries(CAW) stake, but was successful in gaining a Board seat. Hopefully, Biglari’s persistence with Cracker Barrel will pay off for his shareholders.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in and

Biglari Continues To Quack, Wear Duck Costume

An alleged duck

Image via Wikipedia

If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it might just be playing dress up. In his continuing effort to pretend to be , (BH) announced this morning that its Board Of Directors had approved a 1-15 reverse stock split.  This follows a previous 1-20 reverse split, and will be followed up by the previously announced creation of a non-voting Class B stock that will be 1/50th of the newly reverse split A shares.  It shouldn’t be long before Mr. changes his first name to Warren.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in

Biglari Holdings Ups Offer For Fremont Michigan to $31

New Years's Eve Fireworks
Image by c r i s via Flickr

Two days after sending a letter to the Michigan Insuracorp(FMMH.OB) board reiterating its $29 cash offer, (BH) issued a press release this evening, increasing its offer to $31 per share in cash. Though it was disclosed that the companies had met on December 1, Fremont has not publicly responded to ’s previous offer, other than to say that a special committee had been convened to evaluate the offer.

Biglari’s previous takeover attempt of Fremont resulted in Fremont successfully lobbying for a Michigan state law specifically tailored to prevent its takeover. Given the premium that this offer represents to both Fremont’s trading price and its book value, it is difficult to understand how Fremont’s board can continue to ignore it.  Or perhaps they’ll just issue another press release with helpful tips for safe New Years Eve driving, and ignore the elephant in the room.

Disclosure: The author owns shares of both and

Biglari Holdings($BH) Ups Offer to Buy Fremont Michigan($FMMH)

Last year, before engaging in a prolonged exercise(still not complete) in executive compensation, Bilgari Holdings(BH) made a $24.50 cash and stock bid for Michigan(FMMH). The bid was almost immediately rejected by Fremont, which then lobbied successfully to have a Michigan law passed making a transaction far more difficult. After many months of silence, Holdings made public a new offer at $29 all cash bid for Fremont late yesterday. There has been no public response from Fremont yet.

This morning, Biglari filed an updated 13-D which includes the letter sent yesterday to the Fremont Board:

Dear Board Members:
Biglari Holdings Inc., which currently owns 9.9% of the outstanding shares of common stock of InsuraCorp, Inc. (“Fremont”), has been interested in acquiring Fremont in a negotiated transaction. Now we are willing to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of Fremont that we do not already own, through an appropriate acquisition entity, by tender offer followed by a back-end merger, for a purchase price of $29 per share in cash.  This offer represents a 41% premium over the closing price of Fremont’s common stock of $20.50 on October 11, 2010.  We believe our proposal provides certainty and liquidity for the shareholders of Fremont, consequently representing the best means for them to realize full and fair value for their shares.
As you are aware, on December 21, 2009, we proposed to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of Fremont at a price of $24.50 per share, which represented an 11.3% premium over the then $22.01 closing price of Fremont’s common stock, for a combination of stock and cash. We also filed for regulatory approval with the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation to acquire those shares of Fremont we did not already own. Rather than accept our invitation to meet with members of the Board to discuss our proposal, Fremont responded by (1) announcing a mere two days later, on December 23, 2009, that it had rejected our proposal and (2) reducing the share ownership threshold required to trigger its poison pill from 15% to 9.999%.
In addition, Fremont’s senior officers and directors became intimately involved in promoting and lobbying extensively for Michigan Public Act 61 Section 1311(2), which became effective on April 30, 2010. Section 1311(2) of the Act applies solely to a Michigan domestic property and casualty insurer that has 200 or fewer employees and derived 100% of its premiums from sales in Michigan. It requires the approval of 66.67% of all outstanding shares for any proposal to merge with or otherwise acquire control of the insurance company, or any proposal to elect two or more members to its board of directors for purposes of obtaining control of the insurance company, unless these proposals are supported by a majority of the insurance company’s board of directors. We believe this Act runs directly contrary to the spirit of the proxy access rules recently adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and limits the rights of shareholders, the true owners of Fremont.
Moreover, when Fremont’s Board refused to meet to consider a transaction as well as spent shareholder money to lobby the legislature to limit shareholder rights, we announced on April 30, 2010 that we would not vote for Fremont’s director nominees at its upcoming annual meeting. In addition, on May 18, 2010, we delivered to the Board a formal notice and demand, pursuant to the section of the Michigan Business Corporation Act governing derivative shareholder proceedings, demanding that it appoint an independent committee to investigate the diversion of Fremont’s resources and assets towards its lobbying efforts. Additionally, our formal notice calls for the investigation of the usage of Fremont employees to promote and lobby for legislation that restricts the voting and other rights of Fremont’s shareholders — actions that we believe violate the Board’s fiduciary duties.  Fremont has yet to announce the results of this investigation.
In the interest and benefit of all shareholders, this stalemate should end. has always been willing to meet with the Fremont Board to discuss a transaction.  It is incumbent on the Fremont Board, in the proper exercise of its fiduciary duties, to do the same now, and not reject this offer.
Biglari Holdings has available the financial resources to complete the proposed transaction, and, accordingly, the transaction would not be subject to any financing contingency.  As indicated above, the regulatory process to obtain approval for this transaction is well underway, and we believe that all required regulatory approvals for this transaction endorsed by Fremont’s Board of Directors can be obtained expeditiously once a definitive agreement has been reached. We believe, beyond a doubt, that the proposed transaction can be closed quickly and with certitude.
As stated in our December 21, 2009 letter, we want all members of the Fremont management team, other than the CEO, to remain in place, and are willing to discuss carefully and fully employment agreements with these individuals because they will play an integral role in the new ownership structure. We further anticipate that we would continue to run the business substantially in accordance with Fremont’s current business strategy. We would also maintain Fremont’s valuable employee and agent base, which we view as among its most prime assets.
We look forward to receiving your response to our proposal.
Sincerely,

Sardar Biglari

Fremont has jumped from $20.50 to $28 this morning on the news; it will certainly be interesting to see how this progresses in the coming weeks and months. At this current, higher price, Fremont appears to be more appropriately valued, and it will be difficult for its Board to justify not coming to the table with Biglari.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in both and

Highlights from Steak N Shake(SNS) Chairman Sardar Biglari’s 2009 Letter

Steak n Shake
Image via Wikipedia

Steak N Shake(SNS) has posted the annual letter from Chairman Sardar Biglari. has made great progress with the company since taking over, swinging from a loss of $23 million in 2008 to a profit of $6 million in 2009. The capital structure has been greatly strengthened. After beginning the year with just $6.9 million in cash and $30.7 million in debt, the year ended with $54.4 million in cash and investments, and just $18.6 million in debt. The swing in cash was largely driven by a decrease in capital expenditure to $5.7 million, down from $31.4 million 2008 and $68.6 million in 2007.

The fear when slashing capital expenditure is a decrease in sales, but Q4 featured a 20% increase in customer traffic and a 10.1% increase in same store sales, the best quarter yet in the recent reversal of a multi-year tend of declining sales.

Biglari also announced a 1 for 20 reverse split, effective December 18, in order to discourage speculation in the stock, marking an interesting counter to Buffett’s recent decision to split Berkshire Hathaway B shares as part of the Burlington Northern acquisition.

Biglari reitierated that increasing intrinsic value is his only goal, and promised that “Rest assured, we
will fire ourselves if we fail to create value over time.” Towards this end, we are told again of the holding company structure and Biglari as the sole authority on allocating capital.

Biglari provides a brief history of his involvement with Western Sizzlin(WEST) and the upcoming merger, but does not mention his most recent move, the acquisition of a 9.9% stake in Corp(FMMH)

Biglari has produced impressive results in his short career, and it would appear that he is poised to build on his success and continue to deliver superior returns on capital.

Disclosure: I own shares in ,, ,and

Steak N Shake($SNS) Looks To Invest Excess Cash

The Company(SNS) filed an 8-k this afternoon disclosing that it has amended its credit agreement to “permit the Company to use up to $10.0 million of surplus cash to make investments of any lawful nature, so long as no event of default exists.”

In addition, the Company has granted “Chief Executive Officer, Sardar , full power and authority to make all investment and capital allocation decisions on behalf of the Company”

Biglari, through the Lion Fund, Western Sizzlin(WEST) and other affiliated parties controls 10.1% of Steak N Shake’s outstanding stock. After taking control of , Mr. Biglari gained approval to invest cash and has made various investments including .  His operating strategy of halting new company-owned stores, refranchising others and focusing on increasing sales and profitability of existing stores seems to be paying off as earlier this week reported impressive same-store sales gains in a very difficult environment for casual dining. is now doing sufficiently well, that Mr. Biglari and the board believe that cash might be deployed for a better return outside of its core business.

Though Mr. Biglari has shown a soft spot for casual dining stocks(he held a significant stake in Friendly’s prior to WEST and SNS, and at one time attempted a tender for part of JBX), he has also purchased a financial adviser, tendered for ITEX, a bartering company, and purchased real estate for development.  It will be interesting to see where and when Mr. Biglari decides to invest this excess cash.

Disclosure: I have a position in SNS and WEST


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