Biglari Takes Another Crack At Cracker Barrel

Unchastened by his unsuccessful proxy fight for a Board seat at Cracker Barrel(CBRL), (BH) Chairman and CEO Sardar has begun aggressively purchasing Cracker Barrel stock once again.  had been held to 9.9% by

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store

a rights plan which was voted down by shareholders at the annual meeting in December.  Free to acquire more Cracker Barrel stock, it was reported last week that Biglari had upped his stake to 11.8%. Now, a new 13D/A has been filed showing he has continued to buy this week, reaching 13.3% of the company, even as the price went up.  It’s not clear how much more Biglari will acquire, but one thing is clear- he’s not done fighting.  Biglari’s track record in unlocking value at Michigan Insuracorp, and Penn Miller is impressive.  He is underwater on his (CAW) stake, but was successful in gaining a Board seat. Hopefully, Biglari’s persistence with Cracker Barrel will pay off for his shareholders.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in and

Sloppy Reporting By MarketWatch on Biglari Holdings(BH)

I hate to pick on the work of an intern, but presumably the value add of a site like MarketWatch is that there is editorial staff. How then did a piece of under 100 words manage to make multiple errors, mislead and add nothing of value? Intern Sara Sjolin clearly began with the premise that (BH) move of over 5% today was newsworthy and required explanation. Here is her dispatch:

New York (MarketWatch) — Shares of Holdings Inc. BH +4.13% rose 5.6% Friday after a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission showed that Biglari Sardar, the chairman of the company, bought 150 shares at $377.13 a share over the past few days. The insider purchase totaled $56,565 and Michael Gallo, analyst at CL King & Associates, said that the chairman has not bought stock since the price was at $300 a share and that it explains the stock move.

The story erroneously refers to as Biglari Sardar and fails to note that he is CEO as well as Chairman. It attributes the stock’s rise to Mr. Biglari’s purchase of shares without noting that Mr. Biglari is required to use a significant percentage of his bonus compensation to purchase company shares on the open market.  It further quotes an analyst erroneously claiming that Mr. Biglari had not purchased since the stock was at $300, when a simple perusal of SEC filings shows that his last purchase was 639 shares on 3/14 for $403.66.

I hope that if Sara or her editors read this, they take it as a reminder of the importance of verifying facts and statements.  If a little part-time blogger like me can spot 4 major errors in a 100 word article in 5 minutes, an organization with the resources of MarketWatch ought to do better. A message to readers as well, make sure to verify what you read no matter where it’s published.

Disclosure: The author owns shares of

Biglari Continues To Quack, Wear Duck Costume

An alleged duck

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If it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it might just be Sardar playing dress up. In his continuing effort to pretend to be , (BH) announced this morning that its Board Of Directors had approved a 1-15 reverse stock split.  This follows a previous 1-20 reverse split, and will be followed up by the previously announced creation of a non-voting Class B stock that will be 1/50th of the newly reverse split A shares.  It shouldn’t be long before Mr. Biglari changes his first name to Warren.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in

Fremont Michigan Board Continues To Look Out For Themselves, Ignore Owners

Michigan entrance sign
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At the risk of this blog devolving into a single stock focus, we once again write today about the long saga of Holdings’(BH) pursuit of Insuracorp(FMMH).  Having run out, apparently, of tips on safe driving to issue press releases about, ’s special committee finally got around to issuing a press release acknowledging that it had received Biglari’s revised $31 per share offer last year.  Mind you, the committee hasn’t made any decision on it.  Accepting an offer far above any price the company has ever traded at is not a decision to be taken lightly, and the company made clear that

Neither Fremont nor the special committee has set a definitive timetable for completion of its evaluation and there can be no assurances that the process will result in any transaction being announced or being completed.  Fremont does not intend to disclose developments regarding this process unless and until the Board of Directors has approved a specific transaction

No need to rush to any conclusion here for this Board. After all, there are tons of other options they have.  Why, there are so many, that they’ve

retained Philo Smith Capital Corporation as its financial advisor to explore a broad range of strategic alternatives to enhance shareholder value. These alternatives include, but are not limited to, a revised business plan, operating partnerships, joint ventures, strategic alliances, acquisitions, exchange listing applications, a recapitalization, and the sale or merger of Fremont.

As a shareholder, I’m thrilled by this process. The exciting prospect of  a magical revised business plan which will increase the company’s value overnight, without risk, is clearly superior to an all-cash offer well above its historical trading range.

Clearly, the Board knows it has no obligation to shareholders, nor is there any need to meet with large shareholders. That is why the Board refused to meet with  9% holder Loeb Capital Management, as disclosed in Loeb’s recent letter to the Board.

Loeb has the audacity in its letter to expect the Board to be responsive to shareholders and to create shareholder value, rather than protect their own jobs.  Loeb President writes

What does all of this even mean? A “revised business plan?” Should this lead us to believe that the current business plan is flawed and that conjuring up a new business plan with all of the risks involved is better for owners than a sale to the highest bidder? Should we be further led to believe that your newfound interest in endeavors such as “joint ventures,” “operating partnerships,” “acquisitions” and other mechanisms of avoidance are superior for shareholders to a sale to the highest bidder? Should we take the opinion that your avoidance of dialogue with representatives from Biglari, as outlined in the October 11, 2010 letter from to the Board of Directors of , is good for shareholders? Is it good for shareholders that the management team and Board of have helped to disenfranchise shareholders by helping to cement the application of Michigan Public Act 61 Section 1311(2) to its shareholders? Your actions as they relate to Biglari’s offer indicate to us that the leadership at does not take its fiduciary duties seriously. What is perhaps most frightening to us is your depiction of the value-enhancement process (which we feel should be a value-maximization process and not a value-enhancement process) as a process without a timetable. We believe that any well-organized value-enhancement process should be governed by a strict timetable if possible; a sophisticated dealmaker should know that deals tend to ripen and then rot if not consummated in a timely and organized fashion. Frankly, we feel that the management and Board of , in light of the issued press release, wish for the one value-enhancing event that has occurred in recent history to simply vanish with time and attrition of buyer interest.

As King points out, if the Fremont Board just waits long enough, Biglari will move on to another target, and given that the 100% increase in stock price has occurred as a direct result of the offer, despite declining combined ratios and other fundamentals, there will be a huge decline in value for owners. But don’t worry, the secret special committee will still have jobs.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in both and FMMH

Biglari Holdings Ups Offer For Fremont Michigan to $31

New Years's Eve Fireworks
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Two days after sending a letter to the Insuracorp(FMMH.OB) board reiterating its $29 cash offer, (BH) issued a press release this evening, increasing its offer to $31 per share in cash. Though it was disclosed that the companies had met on December 1, has not publicly responded to ’s previous offer, other than to say that a special committee had been convened to evaluate the offer.

Biglari’s previous takeover attempt of Fremont resulted in Fremont successfully lobbying for a Michigan state law specifically tailored to prevent its takeover. Given the premium that this offer represents to both Fremont’s trading price and its book value, it is difficult to understand how Fremont’s board can continue to ignore it.  Or perhaps they’ll just issue another press release with helpful tips for safe New Years Eve driving, and ignore the elephant in the room.

Disclosure: The author owns shares of both and

Biglari Holdings Proposes The Creation Of Non-Voting Class B Shares

New York Stock Exchange
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In the latest step in his effort to mimic , of (BH) has proposed to create a new, non-voting class of shares, which existing class A shares could be converted to at a rate of somewhere between 20 to 1 and 50 to 1. The disclosure came in an otherwise unremarkable 8-K filed this morning detailing items to be voted on at the upcoming annual meeting of shareholders.

The proposal to divide the Company’s common stock into two classes would stipulate that the existing common stock be re-designated as Class A Common Stock, whose rights, powers and privileges would remain the same, except as described in the remainder of this paragraph.  The proposal would create a new class of non-voting, non-convertible Class B Common Stock.  It is further anticipated that the Class A Common Stock would be convertible into as few as 20 and as many as 50 shares of the Class B Common Stock.  The full terms of the Class A and Class B Common Stock will be described in the proxy statement accompanying the Annual Meeting. These terms are subject to the approval of the Company’s stockholders and the New York Stock Exchange.

Mr. has previously taken steps to copy Hathaway, including a company name with the same initials, identical annual report design, similar corporate website, reverse split to create higher share price, and dogged pursuit of an auto insurance carrier.  Beyond window dressing, the move is likely intended to consolidate Biglari’s power as shares not under his control convert over time. Class B share may also create a currency for transactions that will not dilute Mr. Biglari’s vote.

Disclosure: The author owns shares of both and

Fremont Michigan(FMMH) responds to Biglari Holdings(BH) Letter

Insuracorp(FMMH) issued a terse statement today acknowledging receipt of a letter from Sardar Biglari, CEO of Holdings(BH) earlier this week, proposing to buy all shares of Fremont that does not own for $29 per share.

stated that it has asked a Special Committee of the Board to evaluate the offer, and that

“Our Board, management team, associates and agents remain focused on continuing to grow our business and maximizing the value of the Company,” said Richard E. Dunning, President and CEO of Fremont.  ”Our Board takes its fiduciary duty seriously, and we will carefully review this matter in light of its impact on our shareholders, and all our stakeholders, as well as current laws and regulations.”

The last part, regarding “current laws and regulations”, is particularly interesting given that Fremont’s previous response to an overture from Biglari was to lobby successfully for a new law to pass in Michigan requiring a 2/3 majority of shareholders to support a change of control for Fremont Michigan or any company substantially similar to it. It remains uncertain what the next step will be here, but it should be interesting to watch.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in both and

Biglari Holdings($BH) Ups Offer to Buy Fremont Michigan($FMMH)

Last year, before engaging in a prolonged exercise(still not complete) in executive compensation, Bilgari Holdings(BH) made a $24.50 cash and stock bid for Michigan(FMMH). The bid was almost immediately rejected by Fremont, which then lobbied successfully to have a Michigan law passed making a transaction far more difficult. After many months of silence, made public a new offer at $29 all cash bid for Fremont late yesterday. There has been no public response from Fremont yet.

This morning, filed an updated 13-D which includes the letter sent yesterday to the Fremont Board:

Dear Board Members:
Biglari Holdings Inc., which currently owns 9.9% of the outstanding shares of common stock of InsuraCorp, Inc. (“Fremont”), has been interested in acquiring Fremont in a negotiated transaction. Now we are willing to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of Fremont that we do not already own, through an appropriate acquisition entity, by tender offer followed by a back-end merger, for a purchase price of $29 per share in cash.  This offer represents a 41% premium over the closing price of Fremont’s common stock of $20.50 on October 11, 2010.  We believe our proposal provides certainty and liquidity for the shareholders of Fremont, consequently representing the best means for them to realize full and fair value for their shares.
As you are aware, on December 21, 2009, we proposed to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of Fremont at a price of $24.50 per share, which represented an 11.3% premium over the then $22.01 closing price of Fremont’s common stock, for a combination of stock and cash. We also filed for regulatory approval with the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation to acquire those shares of Fremont we did not already own. Rather than accept our invitation to meet with members of the Board to discuss our proposal, Fremont responded by (1) announcing a mere two days later, on December 23, 2009, that it had rejected our proposal and (2) reducing the share ownership threshold required to trigger its poison pill from 15% to 9.999%.
In addition, Fremont’s senior officers and directors became intimately involved in promoting and lobbying extensively for Michigan Public Act 61 Section 1311(2), which became effective on April 30, 2010. Section 1311(2) of the Act applies solely to a Michigan domestic property and casualty insurer that has 200 or fewer employees and derived 100% of its premiums from sales in Michigan. It requires the approval of 66.67% of all outstanding shares for any proposal to merge with or otherwise acquire control of the insurance company, or any proposal to elect two or more members to its board of directors for purposes of obtaining control of the insurance company, unless these proposals are supported by a majority of the insurance company’s board of directors. We believe this Act runs directly contrary to the spirit of the proxy access rules recently adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and limits the rights of shareholders, the true owners of Fremont.
Moreover, when Fremont’s Board refused to meet to consider a transaction as well as spent shareholder money to lobby the legislature to limit shareholder rights, we announced on April 30, 2010 that we would not vote for Fremont’s director nominees at its upcoming annual meeting. In addition, on May 18, 2010, we delivered to the Board a formal notice and demand, pursuant to the section of the Michigan Business Corporation Act governing derivative shareholder proceedings, demanding that it appoint an independent committee to investigate the diversion of Fremont’s resources and assets towards its lobbying efforts. Additionally, our formal notice calls for the investigation of the usage of Fremont employees to promote and lobby for legislation that restricts the voting and other rights of Fremont’s shareholders — actions that we believe violate the Board’s fiduciary duties.  Fremont has yet to announce the results of this investigation.
In the interest and benefit of all shareholders, this stalemate should end. Biglari Holdings has always been willing to meet with the Fremont Board to discuss a transaction.  It is incumbent on the Fremont Board, in the proper exercise of its fiduciary duties, to do the same now, and not reject this offer.
Biglari Holdings has available the financial resources to complete the proposed transaction, and, accordingly, the transaction would not be subject to any financing contingency.  As indicated above, the regulatory process to obtain approval for this transaction is well underway, and we believe that all required regulatory approvals for this transaction endorsed by Fremont’s Board of Directors can be obtained expeditiously once a definitive agreement has been reached. We believe, beyond a doubt, that the proposed transaction can be closed quickly and with certitude.
As stated in our December 21, 2009 letter, we want all members of the Fremont management team, other than the CEO, to remain in place, and are willing to discuss carefully and fully employment agreements with these individuals because they will play an integral role in the new ownership structure. We further anticipate that we would continue to run the business substantially in accordance with Fremont’s current business strategy. We would also maintain Fremont’s valuable employee and agent base, which we view as among its most prime assets.
We look forward to receiving your response to our proposal.
Sincerely,

Sardar Biglari

Fremont has jumped from $20.50 to $28 this morning on the news; it will certainly be interesting to see how this progresses in the coming weeks and months. At this current, higher price, Fremont appears to be more appropriately valued, and it will be difficult for its Board to justify not coming to the table with Biglari.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in both and

Highlights from Steak N Shake(SNS) Chairman Sardar Biglari’s 2009 Letter

Steak n Shake
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(SNS) has posted the annual letter from Chairman Sardar Biglari. has made great progress with the company since taking over, swinging from a loss of $23 million in 2008 to a profit of $6 million in 2009. The capital structure has been greatly strengthened. After beginning the year with just $6.9 million in cash and $30.7 million in debt, the year ended with $54.4 million in cash and investments, and just $18.6 million in debt. The swing in cash was largely driven by a decrease in capital expenditure to $5.7 million, down from $31.4 million 2008 and $68.6 million in 2007.

The fear when slashing capital expenditure is a decrease in sales, but Q4 featured a 20% increase in customer traffic and a 10.1% increase in same store sales, the best quarter yet in the recent reversal of a multi-year tend of declining sales.

Biglari also announced a 1 for 20 reverse split, effective December 18, in order to discourage speculation in the stock, marking an interesting counter to Buffett’s recent decision to split Berkshire Hathaway B shares as part of the Burlington Northern acquisition.

Biglari reitierated that increasing intrinsic value is his only goal, and promised that “Rest assured, we
will fire ourselves if we fail to create value over time.” Towards this end, we are told again of the holding company structure and Biglari as the sole authority on allocating capital.

Biglari provides a brief history of his involvement with Western Sizzlin(WEST) and the upcoming merger, but does not mention his most recent move, the acquisition of a 9.9% stake in Corp(FMMH)

Biglari has produced impressive results in his short career, and it would appear that he is poised to build on his success and continue to deliver superior returns on capital.

Disclosure: I own shares in ,, ,and FMMH

Steak N Shake($SNS) Looks To Invest Excess Cash

The Company(SNS) filed an 8-k this afternoon disclosing that it has amended its credit agreement to “permit the Company to use up to $10.0 million of surplus cash to make investments of any lawful nature, so long as no event of default exists.”

In addition, the Company has granted “Chief Executive Officer, , full power and authority to make all investment and capital allocation decisions on behalf of the Company”

, through the Lion Fund, Western Sizzlin(WEST) and other affiliated parties controls 10.1% of Steak N Shake’s outstanding stock. After taking control of , Mr. Biglari gained approval to invest cash and has made various investments including .  His operating strategy of halting new company-owned stores, refranchising others and focusing on increasing sales and profitability of existing stores seems to be paying off as earlier this week reported impressive same-store sales gains in a very difficult environment for casual dining. is now doing sufficiently well, that Mr. Biglari and the board believe that cash might be deployed for a better return outside of its core business.

Though Mr. Biglari has shown a soft spot for casual dining stocks(he held a significant stake in Friendly’s prior to WEST and SNS, and at one time attempted a tender for part of JBX), he has also purchased a financial adviser, tendered for ITEX, a bartering company, and purchased real estate for development.  It will be interesting to see where and when Mr. Biglari decides to invest this excess cash.

Disclosure: I have a position in SNS and WEST


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