Li Lu Will Not Be Coming To Berkshire

Warren Buffett speaking to a group of students...
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, thought by many to be ’s successor as investment manager at has decided to stay at his own hedge fund, Buffett said. In the wake of today’s surprise announcement that Todd Combs would be joining Berkshire as investment manager,  New York Times’ Andrew Ross Sorkin spoke to Buffett:

One person no longer expected to be in the mix is Li Lu, a Chinese hedge fund manager who had been mentioned as a likely candidate. Mr. Buffett said Mr. Li, who did not return a telephone call Monday, had decided to stay at his own fund.

Buffett did make clear that there may be additional investment managers, and this is distinct from the CEO position.

Disclosure: The author owns BRKB

Mr. Combs Goes To Omaha(BRKA,BRKB)

In a move that is sure to stun even the most ardent watchers, (BRKA,BRKB) announced today that they have hired to “handle a significant portion of Berkshire’s investment portfolio” as an investment manager.

Mr. Combs, who has heretofore been largely unknown, has been managing a hedge fund for for the past 5 years. His most recent 13-F lists the following holdings:

Name of Issuer                       Title Cusip      Mkt Val     Shr/Prn
                                      Class            (USD)       Amount
AERCAP HOLDINGS NV ORD CMN            COM  N00985106   9,529,000     918,001 SH
ANNALY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC CMN    COM  035710409  12,245,000     714,000 SH
BLACKROCK INC. CMN                    COM  09247X101   5,119,000      35,700 SH
BROADRIDGE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS INC    COM  11133T103   9,716,000     510,000 SH
CIT GROUP INC CMN CLASS A             COM  125581801  12,088,000     357,000 SH
CME GROUP INC. CMN CLASS A	      COM  12572Q105  14,360,000      51,000 SH
CHATHAM LODGING TR COM                COM  12608T102   1,914,000     107,100 SH
CHUBB CORP CMN                        COM  171232101  12,753,000     255,000 SH
WTS/FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP 12.90     WTS  320209117   2,135,000     304,917 SH
GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC CMN CLASS A    COM  37247D106   7,999,000     612,020 SH
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. CMN         COM  38141G104  10,712,000      81,600 SH
HARTFORD FINANCIAL SRVCS GROUP CMN    COM  416515104   4,515,000     204,000 SH
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO CMN               COM  46625H100  11,203,000     306,000 SH
LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP CMN            COM  527288104   4,976,000     255,000 SH
MB FINANCIAL INC. NEW CMN             COM  55264U108   9,379,000     510,000 SH
MASTERCARD INCORPORATED CMN CLASS A   COM  57636Q104  20,352,000     102,000 SH
PENNYMAC MTG INVT TR CMN              COM  70931T103  12,974,000     816,003 SH
WTS/THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP    WTS  693475121   2,144,000     185,000 SH
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATION CMN           COM  743315103  11,457,000     612,000 SH
RENAISSANCE RE HOLDINGS LTD CMN       COM  G7496G103  14,349,000     255,000 SH
CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION CMN        COM  808513105  10,125,000     714,000 SH
STARWOOD PROPERTY TRUST INC CMN       COM  85571B105  12,535,000     739,500 SH
STATE STREET CORPORATION(NEW) CMN     COM  857477103  18,973,000     561,000 SH
U.S. BANCORP CMN                      COM  902973304  22,797,000   1,020,000 SH
UNITED AMERICA INDEMNITY LTD CMN CL A COM  90933T109   5,255,000     714,000 SH
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY NON-CUM PERPET  CNV  949746804   1,862,000       2,000 SH
WESTERN UNION COMPANY CMN             COM  959802109  18,250,000   1,224,000 SH

A first glance shows many financial and insurance names. We have not yet had a chance to go back over previous 13-Fs to review changes, but we’re certain that scores of such analysis are going on as we write.

Mr. Combs is 39, and well fits with Mr. Buffett’s stated goal of hiring managers who are likely to remain at Berkshire for several decades.

Update: As is often the case with Bufffett-related stories, Carol Loomis of Fortune gets the scoop. Loomis spoke to Buffett about Combs, and described him as an “All-American type” and not interested in publicity. He also revealed that, like , Combs had been introduced to him by Munger. Loomis also provides some more analysis of Combs’ track record.

Disclosure: The author owns shares of BRKB

Fremont Michigan(FMMH) responds to Biglari Holdings(BH) Letter

Michigan Insuracorp(FMMH) issued a terse statement today acknowledging receipt of a letter from Sardar Biglari, CEO of (BH) earlier this week, proposing to buy all shares of Fremont that Holdings does not own for $29 per share.

Fremont stated that it has asked a Special Committee of the Board to evaluate the offer, and that

“Our Board, management team, associates and agents remain focused on continuing to grow our business and maximizing the value of the Company,” said Richard E. Dunning, President and CEO of Fremont.  ”Our Board takes its fiduciary duty seriously, and we will carefully review this matter in light of its impact on our shareholders, and all our stakeholders, as well as current laws and regulations.”

The last part, regarding “current laws and regulations”, is particularly interesting given that Fremont’s previous response to an overture from Biglari was to lobby successfully for a new law to pass in Michigan requiring a 2/3 majority of shareholders to support a change of control for or any company substantially similar to it. It remains uncertain what the next step will be here, but it should be interesting to watch.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in both and

Biglari Holdings($BH) Ups Offer to Buy Fremont Michigan($FMMH)

Last year, before engaging in a prolonged exercise(still not complete) in executive compensation, Bilgari Holdings(BH) made a $24.50 cash and stock bid for (FMMH). The bid was almost immediately rejected by , which then lobbied successfully to have a Michigan law passed making a transaction far more difficult. After many months of silence, Holdings made public a new offer at $29 all cash bid for Fremont late yesterday. There has been no public response from Fremont yet.

This morning, Biglari filed an updated 13-D which includes the letter sent yesterday to the Fremont Board:

Dear Board Members:
Biglari Holdings Inc., which currently owns 9.9% of the outstanding shares of common stock of Fremont Michigan InsuraCorp, Inc. (“Fremont”), has been interested in acquiring Fremont in a negotiated transaction. Now we are willing to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of Fremont that we do not already own, through an appropriate acquisition entity, by tender offer followed by a back-end merger, for a purchase price of $29 per share in cash.  This offer represents a 41% premium over the closing price of Fremont’s common stock of $20.50 on October 11, 2010.  We believe our proposal provides certainty and liquidity for the shareholders of Fremont, consequently representing the best means for them to realize full and fair value for their shares.
As you are aware, on December 21, 2009, we proposed to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding shares of common stock of Fremont at a price of $24.50 per share, which represented an 11.3% premium over the then $22.01 closing price of Fremont’s common stock, for a combination of stock and cash. We also filed for regulatory approval with the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation to acquire those shares of Fremont we did not already own. Rather than accept our invitation to meet with members of the Board to discuss our proposal, Fremont responded by (1) announcing a mere two days later, on December 23, 2009, that it had rejected our proposal and (2) reducing the share ownership threshold required to trigger its poison pill from 15% to 9.999%.
In addition, Fremont’s senior officers and directors became intimately involved in promoting and lobbying extensively for Michigan Public Act 61 Section 1311(2), which became effective on April 30, 2010. Section 1311(2) of the Act applies solely to a Michigan domestic property and casualty insurer that has 200 or fewer employees and derived 100% of its premiums from sales in Michigan. It requires the approval of 66.67% of all outstanding shares for any proposal to merge with or otherwise acquire control of the insurance company, or any proposal to elect two or more members to its board of directors for purposes of obtaining control of the insurance company, unless these proposals are supported by a majority of the insurance company’s board of directors. We believe this Act runs directly contrary to the spirit of the proxy access rules recently adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and limits the rights of shareholders, the true owners of Fremont.
Moreover, when Fremont’s Board refused to meet to consider a transaction as well as spent shareholder money to lobby the legislature to limit shareholder rights, we announced on April 30, 2010 that we would not vote for Fremont’s director nominees at its upcoming annual meeting. In addition, on May 18, 2010, we delivered to the Board a formal notice and demand, pursuant to the section of the Michigan Business Corporation Act governing derivative shareholder proceedings, demanding that it appoint an independent committee to investigate the diversion of Fremont’s resources and assets towards its lobbying efforts. Additionally, our formal notice calls for the investigation of the usage of Fremont employees to promote and lobby for legislation that restricts the voting and other rights of Fremont’s shareholders — actions that we believe violate the Board’s fiduciary duties.  Fremont has yet to announce the results of this investigation.
In the interest and benefit of all shareholders, this stalemate should end. has always been willing to meet with the Fremont Board to discuss a transaction.  It is incumbent on the Fremont Board, in the proper exercise of its fiduciary duties, to do the same now, and not reject this offer.
Biglari Holdings has available the financial resources to complete the proposed transaction, and, accordingly, the transaction would not be subject to any financing contingency.  As indicated above, the regulatory process to obtain approval for this transaction is well underway, and we believe that all required regulatory approvals for this transaction endorsed by Fremont’s Board of Directors can be obtained expeditiously once a definitive agreement has been reached. We believe, beyond a doubt, that the proposed transaction can be closed quickly and with certitude.
As stated in our December 21, 2009 letter, we want all members of the Fremont management team, other than the CEO, to remain in place, and are willing to discuss carefully and fully employment agreements with these individuals because they will play an integral role in the new ownership structure. We further anticipate that we would continue to run the business substantially in accordance with Fremont’s current business strategy. We would also maintain Fremont’s valuable employee and agent base, which we view as among its most prime assets.
We look forward to receiving your response to our proposal.
Sincerely,

Sardar Biglari

Fremont has jumped from $20.50 to $28 this morning on the news; it will certainly be interesting to see how this progresses in the coming weeks and months. At this current, higher price, Fremont appears to be more appropriately valued, and it will be difficult for its Board to justify not coming to the table with Biglari.

Disclosure: The author owns shares in both and